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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALMA GLENN PRATT,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, .
Case No. 14469

vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
UINTAH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
%

1&&

Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
IN ANSWER TO
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for breach of contract arising out
of Appellant's failure to renew Respondent's contract of employment with it.

Respondent seeks reinstatement as a teacher with

Appellant and damages for breach of contract including all rights
and benefits which he would have received had he not been improperly terminated by Appellant.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This action was tried to a jury on December 10, 1975,
at Vernal, Utah, before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge.
By stipulation of the parties, the question presented to the jury
was whether or not Respondent resigned his position of employment
with Appellant.

By Special Verdict, the jury found that Respon-

dent had not resigned his position of employment.

The Court en-

tered judgment against Appellant on January 28, 1976 awarding
Respondent $18,070.03 in damages and further ordered Appellant
to reinstate Respondent as a teacher together with all rights
and benefits he would have received had he not been terminated
contrary to the terms of his contract of employment with Appellant.
The Appellant timely appealed the decision of the district court on February 11, 1976.

The issues were briefed and

this Court heard argument on October 12, 1976.
In an opinion filed May 4, 1977, this Court affirmed
the judgment of the district court in favor of the Respondent.
Appellant petitioned for re-hearing May 24, 1977 and that petition
was granted.

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are more fully set forth in
the Brief's previously filed with the Court. Appellant has
cited a portion of the trial transcript in sipport of its
contention that Respondent's stipulation (1) entitled Appellant to have the case dismissed as a matter of law; and (2)
caused it not to assert the defense that it terminated (fired)
Respondent before May 11, 1973, the date the Utah Orderly
School Termination Procedures

Act became effective.

To Appellant's citation of the record must be added the following:
The Court:
Now Mr. Lybbert, you had
you asked Mr. Dibblee to
garding, and Mr. Dibblee
he didn't see any reason
ahead.

;

4

a matter that
stipulate reindicated that
why not—go

^,

Mr. Lybbert:
no;4

;:

I understand that the plaintiff is
willing to stipulate that they have
not preceeded or intended to proceed
under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act and have not attempted nor have
they complied with the notice provisions of that act.

Mr. Dibblee:
I understand that's correct.
Mr. Lybbert:
No. 2: I understand from our previous
conversation that you are not making
any claim under the provisions of the
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, Section 53-51-1, et seq.
Mr. Dibblee:
That's correct.
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The Court:
So whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover, again, is dependant
upon the Jury's verdict as to whether
or not there was a dismissal or a resignation,
Mr. Dibblee:
That's correct, sir. Tr. p.2.
Counsel for the Appellant does not object to the Court's
analysis of the issues at that time, or at any other time during the trial. Again, at page four of the transcript the
Court states:
The Court:
Well, there is a question of fact
though, isn't there; whether he was
dismissed or whether he resigned?
Isn't that a question of fact under
the evidence that you intend to
present, both of you?
Mr. Lybbert:
(Nodded his head.)
Mr. Dibblee:
Well, the defendant of course claims
there was a resignation.
In his opening statement

to the jury, counsel for Appell-

ant stated:
As I see it, the central issue is whether or not Mr. Pratt advised Mr. Evans
in the spring of '73 that he didn't
wish to have his contract renewed with
the District. That's the case. Tr. p.22.
Appellant however, argues that because of Mr. Dibblee's
statements regarding the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, it did not present evidence regarding "a significant factual issue...over the actual date upon which Respondent
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
Clark Law School,
BYU.therp t^o a AA«_
was terminated."
Respondent
thenJ. Reuben
suggests
that
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

agreement as to whether plaintiff was notified April 27, or May
11, 1977 that his contract of employment would not be renewed.
In so framing the issue, Appellant is misleading.

The

issue throughout the trial and the one on which Appellant based its
defense was that Respondent resigned.

The sole issue submitted

to the jury was whether or not Respondent resigned.
that Respondent did not resign.

The jury found

It makes little difference which

date Respondent did not resign as he continued his employment until
the end of the school year, several weeks after the Utah Orderly
School Termination Procedures Act became effective.
Apparently Appellant now asks this Court to permit it
to retry the case on a theory inconsistent with its representations
to the trial court and to the jury.
Moreover, even after Mr. Dibblee?s stipulations to the
Court, the trial court considered the question of dismissal to be
a possible issue in the case.

Tr. pp.2 and 4.

Counsel for Appell-

ant did not object to the trial courts characterization of the issue
until this appeal.
Presumably, Appellant now seeks to retry this case on
the basis that it unlawfully breached Respondent's contract of employment prior to May 11, 1973 when the Utah Orderly School Teacher's Termination Procedures Act became effective and then assert
Respondent's failure to file notice as provided in section 6 §-30-13
of the Governmental

Immunity Act as a defense.
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ARGUMENT
A. THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION
PROCEDURES ACTl/ PROVIDES A METHOD OF
"NOTICE" OF A CLAIM AGAINST THE APPELLANT
THAT FULLY MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT,2/ AND IS A SUBSTITUTE THEREFORE.
In its Brief on appeal Respondent urged this Court to
find that the procedural administrative remedies set forth in the
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act are in lieu of or
a substitute for the notice requirements of section 63-3 0-13 of
the Governmental Immunity Act.
failure to file a notice of

This Court held that Plaintiff's

claim, within ninety days after May

11, 1973, did not bar his claim.

Respondent's arguments in sup-

port of his position appear at pages 10 through 18 of his initial
Brief and need not be repeated.

This court further held that

Respondent's claim did not mature until September 25, 1973 after
the Board of Education held the hearing requested by Respondent
and on that date issued its written determination.
correct

This Court was

in ruling that Respondent's claim did not mature until

September 25, 1973 for two reasons.

First, section 53-6-20, Utah

Code Annotated (Supp. 1975) vests in the board of education of
each school district the power to operate, control and maintain
the school system and to "adopt bylaws and rules for its own procedure and make and enforce rules and regulations for the control
and management of the public schools of the district." As the
Board is vested with the power to control the school district and
it granted the Respondent an opportunity to appear before it before a final decision was made to terminate him, his cause of
1/
2/

Sections 53-50-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (Supp.1975).
Section Digitized
63-30-13,
Annotated
(1953).
by the HowardUtah
W. HunterCode
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

action did not arise until the board took action—September 2 5,
1973.

The second reason the Utah Orderly School Termination

Procedures Act applies is below set forth.
B. THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES ACT IS A REMEDIAL
AND PROCEDURAL ACT AND THEREFORE
OPERATES RETROSPECTIVELY.
Appellant now represents to this Court that for Mr. Dibblee's
"stipulation," it would have argued to the trial court that Mr.
Evans terminated Respondent before the effective date of the Utah
Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, presumably April 27,
1973 instead of May 11, 1973 . Whichever date the "event" took
place, the procedural administrative remedies of the Utah Orderly
School Teachers Termination Procedure Act apply for the reason
that procedural and remedial acts operate retrospectively as well
as prospectively. ..

i :

^

,

. . . remedial or procedural statutes
which do not create, enlarge, diminish,
or destroy contractual or vested rights
but relate only to remedies or modes of
procedure are not within the general
rule against retrospective operation
but are generally held to operate retrospectively. Such statutes will not be
given retrospective operation if to do
so would impair contractual obligation
or serve vested rights, unless the language of the statute indicates that such
is the legislative intent.
While it has been held that a remedial
statute will not be given retrospective
or retroactive operation unless the legislative intent appears on the face of
the statute, expressly, by plain and
positive language, or by necessary implication, the rule that, unless the language of the statute so requires, the statute should not be given retrospective
or retroactive operation has been held
not to apply to purely remedial laws,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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unless an intent to the contrary is
shown; and a remedial statute is to
be construed to give effect the purpose for which it was enacted, and,
if the reason of the statute extends
to the past transactions as well as
those in the future, it will be so
applied, although it does not, in
terms, so direct, unless to do so
would impair some vested right or
violate some constitutional quarantee.
82 CJS, Statutes, §416; See also 82
CJS, Statutes, §421.
A statute is remedial and has retroactive application
when it relates to practice, procedure or remedies and does
not affect a substantive or vested right.

Johnson v. Bene-

ficial Management Corporation of America, 538 p.2d 510 (Wash.
1975); Tellier v. Edwards. 354 P.2d 925 (Wash. 1960).
In the construction of remedial statutes, regard must
always be had for the evident purpose for which the statute
was enacted, and if the reason of the statute extends to past
events as well as those in the future, it will be so applied,
even though the statute does not specifically so direct, unless,
of course, to construe a statute retrospectively would impair
some vested right or impinge on a constitutional guaranty.
Abrams v. Stone, 154 c.A.2d 33, 315 P.2d 453 (1957).
Respondent submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act was enacted as remedial legislation to afford educators procedural due process against harsh, arbitrary or unlawful conduct by a capricious supervisor or superintendent. No
doubt it was also a response to Perry v. Sindermann, 4 08 U.S.
593 (1972) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
wherein the Court held that an individual employed by a unit of
-8-
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government that had a reasonable expectation of continued employment or a contractual right to employment, cannot be deprived of that right without being afforded procedural due
process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
A written contract with an explicit
tenure provision clearly is evidence
of a formal understanding that supports
a teacher's claim of entitlement to
continued employment unless sufficient
"cause" is shown... Perry v. Sindermanny
at 408 U.S. 601.
, ^r, ,^
_
v
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural
protection is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.
Board of Regents v. Roth at 408 U.S. 575.

A

,.
. -r

It is the purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be
arbitrarily undermined. It is the purpose of the constitutional right to a
hearing to provide an opportunity for
a person to vindicate those claims.
K ,, ; • Id. at 577.
Initially, Mr. Evans maintained that Respondent's contract and "tenure" were with the school that was closed..
Later, he took the position that Respondent resigned. Now,
Appellant wants to argue that Respondent was terminated.
jury found that Respondent did not resign.

The

Respondent's con-

tract of employment clearly gave him a contract right to continued employment.

If he were terminated, it is submitted

that under the doctrines developed in Perry and Roth, Respondent had a constitutional right to procedural due process and
therefore, a fair hearing.

The Utah Orderly School Teacher
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Termination Procedures Act merely prescribes the procedure
for procedural due process. As such, the statute has retrospective application.
C. STIPULATIONS BY COUNSEL PRIOR TO
TRIAL IN NO WAY EFFECT THIS CASE.
For the reasons above stated, the stipulation made by
counsel for Respondent prior to trial in no way effect the
basis upon which the Court has decided this case.

It must

here be noted that Appellant's representation to this Court
that, "There has never been so much as a suggestion either
in the trial transcript, at post-trial hearings, in the Respondent's brief on appeal or in the arguments before this
Court, that the stipulation did not accurately set forth
the agreement of the parties", is misleading.

Both at post-

trial hearings and at page 11 of Respondent's brief, Respondent has maintained that Mr. Dibblee's stipulation went only
to the claim of procedural due process. That is what the act
requires.

The board granted the hearing and made its decision.

No claim was thereafter asserted that the district had failed
to comply with it's requirements.

Respondent submits that

the purpose of the notice requirement in the Governmental Immunity Act is to give a public body notice of a claim before
it results in litigation. (See pages 16 and 17 of Respondent's
initial Brief.)

The request for hearing and hearing provision's

of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act fully satisfies the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity
Act.

(See pages 10 through 18 of Respondent's initial Brief.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully requests this Court re-affirm it's
earlier decision entered in this matter.

In the event this Court

grants Appellant's request for a new trial, Respondent requests
that the new trial be limited to only those issues of fact not
already decided by the jury in this case,
Respectfully submitted this &C ^J

r

,

day of \Jt )fiP~'

,.!f?r;
1977.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief
were mailed, postage prepaid, to counsel for Appellant, Merlin
R. Lybbert, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, this t^L y

day of June, 1977.
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